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Abstract: We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do 
not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, 
reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that 
include additional economic, historical, and geographic controls. 
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Are new states more corrupt? Newly independent states may lack the monitoring and 
governance mechanisms to control corruption.1 Furthermore, the transition to independent 
statehood may bring forth new opportunities for corruption as it is often fraught with political 
and economic instability. Indeed, previous research finds that being a relatively new state has 
a deleterious impact on the perception of corruption (Goel and Nelson, 2010). On the other 
hand, many independence and separatist movements have been motivated, in part, by the desire 
to stamp out corruption. Some may succeed in replacing corrupt regimes with less corrupt ones. 
 
In this article, we analyze the association between corruption and state age across two measures 
of corruption, one based on expert opinions and the other based firms’ experience of bribery. 
In line with Goel and Nelson (2010), we find that being a relatively new state is associated with 
corruption perceptions. However, we find that the age of the state is not associated with firms’ 
experience of bribery. The fact that perceptions do not match experiences suggests that 
relatively new states may suffer an unearned reputational cost. It is plausible that experts 
penalize them because of their shorter history of governance and accountability. Experts 
depend on information to make judgements. The informational gap between older and newer 
states may create more uncertainty among experts, which may translate into more severe 
evaluations. Furthermore, experts may sometimes conflate the informational gap with a lack of 
transparency, again resulting in more severe evaluations. 
 
Our argument is motivated, in part, by recent work which points to the limitations of corruption 
indicators that are based on experts’ perceptions. The possibility of perception biases in 
commonly used metrics of corruption have been raised by Reinikka and Svensson (2006), 
                                                 
1 Our chosen definition of corruption is the abuse of public power for private gain. 
Treisman (2007), and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009). Kenny (2009) argues that reality may 
only feed into perceptions indicators with a lag. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) find that 
surveys of individuals’ corruption perceptions are not consistent with experts’ evaluations due 
to the ideological and cultural biases. Finally, new studies argue that we should consider 
alternative measures based on, for example, public procurement data (Fazekas, Tóth, and King, 
(2016) and audit results (Mondo, 2016). 
 
2. Data and variables 
We use two indicators of corruption. The first is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which 
measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around 
the world (Transparency International, 2016). The indicator is based on expert surveys and 
takes values from 1 to 10. We use data from 2012 to 2016 as previous CPI values were 
computed using a different methodology. The second corruption indicator comes from the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and is based on a survey question designed to capture a firm’s 
total annual informal payment or gifts to public officials. Therefore, it captures bribery 
incidence - the percentage of firms that report having had to pay a bribe across a range on 
interactions with the state.2 These data cover 121 countries from 2002 to 2016. 
 
We measure the age of the state using an indicator that records the time period when a country 
became an independent entity. Previous research has used binary variables which take values 
of 1 if a country became independent after 1950, and 1 if a country became independent before 
1900 (Goel and Nelson, 2010). Our measure of state age improves upon these variables. It 
follows Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), who developed an indicator which takes a value 
of 0 if independent before 1914, 1 if between 1914 and 1945, 2 if between 1946 and 1989, and 
                                                 
2 We acknowledge that the moral connotation of bribery may not be helpful in social contexts where informal 
payment is seen as a normal and legitimate practice. See Ledeneva et al. (Forthcoming). 
3 if after 1990.3 These categories are based on different periods in world politics, characterized 
by shifts in the balance of power in the international system. We updated their data to add states 
formed after 1996. 
 
We follow closely the specifications and approach commonly used in studies that seek to 
explain corruption perceptions at the country level; in particular, the models of Dollar, Fisman, 
and Gatti (2001). To control for the economy we use per capita GDP and to account for broad 
institutional features we use the level of democracy from the Polity IV dataset. To control for 
broad historical factors we use dummy variables that capture the origin of the concurrent legal 
tradition followed by the state, including whether it is British, French, German, Scandinavian, 
or socialist. The economic data is from the World Development Indicators and the legal origin 
dummies are from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003). We also include a battery of 
regional dummies in our analysis to account for other broad cultural, geographic, and historical 
factors. 
 
3. Corruption and state age: expert opinion vs. outcomes 
In Table 1, columns 1-4 present findings related to expert perceptions of corruption. The first 
column is our base specification, which includes estimates of our measure of state age and our 
economic and democracy control variables. The second column adds regional dummy 
variables. The third column adds legal origin dummy variables to our base specification and 
the fourth column includes all of our economic, institutional, historical, and geographic 
controls. Columns 5-8 repeat these specifications using bribery as our outcome of interest.  
 
                                                 
3 The newest states that take a value of “3” for which we have data include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Namibia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
The age of the state is associated with an increase in corruption perceptions across all age 
categories in the full model in column 4. By contrast, the association between bribery and state 
age is less convincing. There is an association between these variables in our base specification 
in column 5 and our specification with regional dummies in column 6. When one controls for 
legal origin, however, this association does not hold. 
 
GDP per capita is positive and associated with a lower incidence of corruption perceptions and 
bribery incidence across all of our specifications. A socialist history is bad for both perceptions 
and bribery incidence, across all specifications. This is interesting in the context of our study 
as a socialist legal origin suggests a state of a particular vintage. It is not the age of the state 
that seems to matter for bribe incidence but the type of state it began as. By contrast, the level 
of democracy is associated with improved corruption perceptions but not the incidence of 
bribery.  
 
The regional dummy for sub-Saharan Africa is statistically significant across all of the 
specifications where it is included. Surprisingly, the direction of the coefficient suggests that 
corruption, whether measured using expert opinions or bribe incidence, is a smaller problem in 
this region in comparison to other regions. However, this is only when one controls for GDP 




In line with previous research we find that newer states may suffer from a reputational cost in 
terms of corruption perceptions. We find that they receive stricter expert evaluations even 
though businesses on the ground do not report paying more bribes. Substantively, this finding 
may have implications for these countries as previous work finds that corruption perceptions 
matter for foreign investment (Wei, 2000) and experts’ rankings of the general business 
environment (Breen and Gillanders, 2012). Like many secretive activities, corruption is 
difficult to measure. Our findings and their implications underline the value and importance of 
using alternative measures of corruption. 
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Table 1. Corruption perceptions vs. bribes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Perceptions Perceptions Perceptions Perceptions Bribe Bribe Bribe Bribe 
         
Age = 1 (1914-1945) -3.57* -7.39*** -4.50*** -7.86*** 5.60** 9.43*** 3.58 6.00 
 (1.858) (1.938) (1.575) (1.682) (2.590) (3.310) (3.717) (3.660) 
Age = 2 (1946-1989) 2.45* -3.68*** 0.93 -3.77*** 2.88 11.50*** 3.64 8.74* 
 (1.410) (1.230) (1.352) (1.270) (2.797) (4.403) (3.238) (4.649) 
Age = 3 (1990-2016) -5.91*** -5.98*** -1.80 -4.98** 3.81 5.31 -2.29 1.78 
 (1.412) (1.906) (1.650) (2.021) (2.417) (3.906) (3.821) (4.172) 
Per capita GDP (log) 9.79*** 9.75*** 8.74*** 9.39*** -6.37*** -8.83*** -6.78*** -7.99*** 
 (0.380) (0.523) (0.386) (0.541) (1.181) (1.246) (1.248) (1.397) 
Democracy scale 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.47*** 0.54*** -0.32 -0.33 -0.23 -0.20 
 (0.075) (0.085) (0.082) (0.091) (0.210) (0.212) (0.229) (0.238) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  5.31**  4.68**  -15.94***  -9.71** 
  (2.206)  (2.214)  (4.596)  (4.605) 
Transition Economy. dummy  -4.07*  0.24  -0.39  -4.35 
  (2.311)  (3.003)  (3.607)  (5.414) 
Western Europe dummy  2.83  -0.70  11.38***  9.75** 
  (2.189)  (2.159)  (2.796)  (3.786) 
Latin America dummy  -12.61***  -10.57***      
  (2.014)  (1.923)     
Asia dummy  1.51  1.09  -5.92  -3.17 
  (1.946)  (2.020)  (4.115)  (4.154) 
French legal origin   -5.04*** -2.90***   0.21 -0.38 
   (1.222) (1.115)   (3.011) (3.249) 
Socialist legal origin   -5.24*** -4.55**   11.00*** 9.77* 
   (1.337) (2.181)   (3.771) (5.497) 
German legal origin   9.14*** 6.18***     
   (1.612) (1.776)     
Scandinavian legal origin   18.83*** 16.22***   8.31**  
   (1.895) (2.311)   (3.800)  
Constant -42.83*** -38.89*** -29.88*** -33.55*** 68.63*** 89.97*** 69.73*** 81.09*** 
 (3.727) (5.275) (3.942) (5.598) (10.270) (10.891) (11.607) (13.681) 
         
Observations 563 563 520 520 216 216 189 189 
R-squared 0.656 0.729 0.721 0.762 0.267 0.341 0.297 0.324 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
